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Introduction 
Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism1 is a sweet read. It is beautifully writ-
ten, illuminating, and provocative. It is conducive to deep reflection about 
foundational questions.  
In the book, Balkin reasons from two points of view—the perspective of 
the constitutional system as a whole and the perspective of the faithful par-
ticipant in that system (p. 130). First, he provides a systemic account of 
constitutional change, which he calls “living constitutionalism.” Second, he 
offers an approach to constitutional interpretation and construction, which 
he calls “framework originalism.” These two components—living constitu-
tionalism and framework originalism—together constitute his overall theory 
of “living originalism.”  
Reasoning from the systemic perspective, Balkin develops an attractive 
theory of the processes of constitutional change. His account features prom-
inently the roles of citizens, social movements, civil society, politicians, and 
judges in shaping the meaning of the Constitution in practice. His approach 
is descriptively more accurate than its main competitors and normatively 
appealing in its emphasis on the need for invested participants in the consti-
tutional system to continuously perceive and vindicate the preconditions for 
the legitimacy of the system. 
Balkin may, however, be too quick to dismiss a concern held by some 
invested participants. These participants fear “that arguing that their views 
are correct is . . . undermined . . . by the theory of how the constitutional 
system produces legitimacy over time” (p. 131). To understand from the 
systemic perspective that “we are . . . participants in a constitutional system 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor of Law and Political Science, Co-Director, Program in Public Law, Duke 
Law School. For illuminating conversations, I thank Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin, Curtis 
Bradley, James Boyle, Bernard Burk, Josh Chafetz, Michael Dorf, Barry Friedman, R. Craig 
Green, Linda Greenhouse, Ralf Michaels, Margaret Lemos, Sanford Levinson, Dahlia 
Lithwick, Robert Post, H. Jefferson Powell, Jedediah Purdy, Reva Siegel, Ernest Young, work-
shop participants at Duke Law School, and participants in “Constitutional Interpretation and 
Change: A Conference on Jack Balkin’s Living Originalism,” which was held at Yale Law 
School on April 27 and 28, 2012. It is rare to encounter a legal academic of Jack’s stature who 
is also a mensch. I am honored to call him my friend. 
 1. Jack M. Balkin is the Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First 
Amendment, Yale Law School.  
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in which dissent and contestation, persuasion and argument, help make the 
system democratically legitimate over time”2 is to acknowledge that the 
meaning of the Constitution in practice changes over time. It is, therefore, to 
stare the fact of interpretive discretion in the face.3 And facing up to the fact 
of discretion encourages consciousness of one’s own consciousness, which 
may cause those who suffer from “modernist anxiety” to question whether 
they can be confident that their own constitutional views are correct.4 Such 
self-confidence, however, underwrites effective advocacy for those who do 
not consider themselves free to act as if they were certain they were right 
when they are, in fact, not certain.5  
Reasoning from the individual perspective, Balkin provides a persuasive, 
if imperfect, account of the characteristic importance of constitutional text 
in the American tradition. But Balkin does not seem to register the potential 
consequences of turning to “originalism” given how long the term has been 
associated in public debates with a conservative political practice. A pro-
gressive declaration in 2013 that “we are all originalists now” would risk 
lending unintended support to the ongoing fruits of conservative original-
ism, including an unsettling of the New Deal Settlement, the Second 
Reconstruction, and more.  
Such a development would be troubling not only from the perspective of 
progressive constitutionalists, but also from the perspective of the constitu-
tional system. Those who either misunderstand Balkin or wish to repurpose 
him—as Balkin seeks to repurpose originalism—might use a progressive 
embrace of Balkin’s very thin version of originalism to throw everyone into 
an easily caricatured originalist camp. That misappropriation, in turn, might 
undermine the diversity of constitutional opinion that exists in fact and that 
secures the legitimacy of the system as a whole.  
Part I describes Balkin’s “living originalism.” It separates the theory into 
its component parts and then considers the theory as a whole. Part II analyz-
es some potential consequences of embracing Balkin’s living 
constitutionalism. It mostly applauds his systemic account of constitutional 
change but questions its compatibility with effective advocacy from the in-
dividual perspective. Part III examines the case for Balkin’s framework 
originalism. It argues that framework originalism better accounts for the 
presumptively exalted status of the constitutional text than does David 
                                                                                                                      
 2. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption 183–84 (2011) [hereinafter Bal-
kin, Constitutional Redemption]. 
 3. It may be possible to view the law as fully determinate but still think that persua-
sion and argument are necessary to legitimate it. Balkin, however, believes that the meaning of 
the Constitution in practice changes over time, and that it must in order to be legitimate. Bal-
kin is right to believe that the meaning of the Constitution in practice changes over time, as the 
recent fight over health care reform illustrates. In National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), five justices articulated a novel constitutional 
distinction between regulating and requiring commerce.  
 4. For a discussion of modernist anxiety, see infra Section II.B. 
 5. In this regard, legal academics may be differently situated from advocates and judg-
es. See infra Section II.B. 
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Strauss’s common law constitutionalism, but questions the political conse-
quences of embracing the “O” word. This Review concludes by identifying 
a common theme connecting the concerns expressed here about Living 
Originalism. That common theme is the difference between constitutional 
theory in an ideal world and constitutional theory in the fallen world we 
inhabit. In this fallen world, our adversaries may not fight fair, we may feel 
disconnected from the past, and our words may have effects in the world 
that we do not intend but that we ignore at our peril. 
I. Living Originalism 
As a description of Balkin’s project, “living originalism” may seem a 
misnomer. An “originalism” that is “living” may be a contradiction in terms. 
After all, “[l]iving constitutionalists argue that the practical meaning of the 
Constitution changes—and should change—in response to changing condi-
tions.”6 “Originalists,” by contrast, “argue that some aspect or feature of the 
Constitution is fixed when the Constitution—or a subsequent amendment to 
the Constitution—is adopted, that it is fixed because of the act of adoption, 
and that this fixed meaning is binding as law today.”7 If living constitutional-
ism focuses on flux, originalism focuses on fixity.  
As these quotations indicate, Balkin is hardly confused about this. His 
“living originalism” is best viewed as a contraction. It combines two  
ideas—living constitutionalism and framework originalism—that together 
constitute his overall theory. In Balkin’s work, “living constitutionalism” 
plus “framework originalism” equals “living originalism.” I consider each 
component separately and then consider them together. 
A. Living Constitutionalism 
If constitutional theories had colors associated with them, originalism’s 
banner would be black or blood red. These colors symbolize death, and 
originalists like Justice Scalia praise the “dead” Constitution.8 In vivid con-
trast, living constitutionalism would fly a green flag. If any season 
symbolizes life, it is spring, and if any color symbolizes springtime, it is 
green.  
Judging from the front of the jacket of Balkin’s book, which is mostly 
black and deep red with just a hint of green light shining through, one might 
think that his theory is more originalist than living constitutionalist. (One 
might further suspect this because “living” modifies “originalism” in the 
book’s title.) The back of the jacket, however, is all green. Moreover, when 
                                                                                                                      
 6. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 226. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 2011, 
2011 (2012) (“In what might be regarded as his standard ‘stump’ speech, Justice Scalia has 
repeatedly championed what he calls the ‘dead Constitution.’ ”); This American Life: Scalia 
Vigorously Defends a “Dead” Constitution (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=90011526. 
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one opens the book, one notices that the jacket is all green on the inside as 
well. And if one removes the jacket, one observes that the book cover itself 
is mostly green. Finally, if one sifts through the first few pages, one discov-
ers that Balkin dedicates the book to his Yale colleagues Reva Siegel and 
Robert Post, two prominent living constitutionalists.9 All of this is symboli-
cally appropriate. In Balkin’s theory, living constitutionalism is no qualifier 
or sideshow. It is the main event. 
Balkin argues that each generation of Americans must implement the 
Constitution’s text, rules, standards, and principles in its own way, which it 
does “through building political institutions, passing legislation, and creat-
ing precedents, both judicial and nonjudicial” (p. 3). He calls this process of 
fleshing out the often underdeterminate constitutional text “constitutional 
construction.” According to Balkin, constitutional constructions by previous 
generations help to “shape how succeeding generations will understand and 
apply the Constitution in their time” (p. 4). He distinguishes constitutional 
construction from constitutional interpretation, which he defines as the act 
of ascertaining the original semantic meaning of the text (p. 4).  
“Living constitutionalism” is Balkin’s term for this interpretive account 
of how the American constitutional system functions and legitimates itself. 
In his view, this account is “the best way to understand the interpretive prac-
tices of our constitutional tradition and the work of the many political and 
social movements that have transformed our understandings of the Constitu-
tion’s guarantees” (p. 4). Balkin underscores that living constitutionalism 
validates the fruits of this social practice, fruits that many Americans today 
view as the practice’s greatest achievements rather than as pragmatic excep-
tions or mistakes that they are stuck with out of respect for stare decisis.10 
Examples of these fruits include Brown v. Board of Education11 and the civil 
rights revolution, Social Security and other safety-net programs, and the 
equal citizenship stature of women.12 
In Balkin’s hands, then, living constitutionalism explains the role of 
constitutional politics in shaping constitutional constructions.13 It also  
provides “a theory about how the entire system of constitutional  
construction—including the work of the political branches, courts, political 
parties, social movements, interest groups, and individual citizens—is con-
sistent with democratic legitimacy” (p. 279). Living constitutionalism does 
not tell judges how to decide constitutional questions.14 Indeed, it is not a 
                                                                                                                      
 9. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in The 
Constitution in 2020, at 25 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009); Robert Post & 
Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 373 (2007). 
 10. Pp. 110–12 (critiquing this strategy of conservative originalism). 
 11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 12. See p. 109 (discussing these and other examples). 
 13. See p. 279 (writing that living constitutionalism “explain[s] how constitutional 
construction occurs in response to constitutional politics”). 
 14. Pp. 277–78 (noting that living constitutionalism is not “a philosophy of judging that 
explains and justifies how courts should interpret the Constitution”). 
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theory of how anyone should decide constitutional questions. Balkin does 
not view living constitutionalism as a decisional approach that can compete 
with the various flavors of non-Balkinian originalism.  
B. Framework Originalism 
If constitutional construction does the work of building out, and if living 
constitutionalism explains how that building out occurs and legitimates it-
self, “framework originalism” identifies what is being built out. This phrase 
captures Balkin’s view that the Constitution provides “an initial framework 
for governance that sets politics in motion” (p. 3). Framework originalism is 
a (mostly underdeterminate) decisional approach. It requires fidelity to, and 
only to, the framework—to the original semantic meaning of the constitu-
tional text and “to the rules, standards, and principles stated by the 
Constitution’s text.”15 Balkin distinguishes his theory of interpretation from 
“skyscraper originalism” (pp. 21–23), which is what most people imagine 
when they imagine originalism. Skyscraper originalists make much greater 
demands on the present by requiring fidelity to original intentions, purposes, 
or expected applications, even when they purport to care only about seman-
tic meaning.16  
In Balkin’s view, regarding oneself as bound by more than framework 
originalism renders one unable to explain the American constitutional tradi-
tion, including its greatest achievements. Moreover, regarding oneself as 
bound by less than framework originalism puts one in essentially the same 
boat as David Strauss’s common law constitutionalism.17 As Balkin under-
stands Strauss’s view, fidelity to the text is nothing more than a convention, 
and no part of the text is unalterable through common law methods. Balkin 
rejects this position as inconsistent with the actual role of the text in consti-
tutional practice. Framework originalism requires fidelity to original 
meaning, nothing more and nothing less. 
C. Living Originalism 
Distinguishing Balkin’s living constitutionalism and framework 
originalism in the way that I have indicates that living originalism is a bit of 
an odd duck. (That is not criticism. My children and I happen to love ducks, 
including odd ones.) Living originalism combines a particular conception of 
the systemic point of view (living constitutionalism) with a certain  
                                                                                                                      
 15. P. 3; see also p. 45.  
 16. See p. 104 (“[T]oday’s original meaning originalists often view original expected 
applications as very strong evidence of original meaning . . . . Hence, even though conserva-
tive originalists may distinguish between the ideas of original meaning and original expected 
applications in theory, they often conflate them in practice.”).  
 17. For Strauss’s most recent articulation of his theory, see David A. Strauss, The 
Living Constitution (2010). See also David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877 (1996); David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, 
and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 Yale L.J. 1717 (2003). 
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conception of the individual point of view (framework originalism). This is 
striking, and it may have implications for the efficacy of constitutional ad-
vocacy in the present, as I suggest in Part II. 
Something else about living originalism is evident from the above de-
scription. To those who adopt the individual perspective, the theory offers 
little guidance regarding how to decide constitutional questions about which 
people disagree. Balkin’s living constitutionalism self-consciously has noth-
ing to say about the matter, and complying with framework originalism is 
not difficult. Anyone can do it.  
Indeed, it is something that almost everyone already does by not argu-
ing, say, that a thirty-four-year-old can become president.18 It is something 
almost everyone already does by possessing some view of constitutional 
equality, ranging from that of the Plessy Court,19 to the Brown Court,20 to 
any member of the Roberts Court.21 In Balkin’s view, the original semantic 
meaning of “equal protection of the laws” is the same as its contemporary 
meaning.22 He does not identify this meaning, but it is capacious. 
Balkin remits the resolution of constitutional questions, whether by citi-
zens, politicians, or judges, to the modalities that characterize familiar 
constitutional practice: history, structure, precedent, ethos, and consequenc-
es.23 In other words, Balkin’s “construction zone” is enormous. Readers 
must look elsewhere if they seek a decision theory to supplant the varieties 
of non-Balkinian originalism, which purport to give relatively detailed an-
swers to the question of what the Constitution means in specific 
controversies. For this reason, I refer to Balkinian originalism as “Diet 
Originalism,” and I contrast it with what Balkin calls “skyscraper original-
ism” and I call “Originalism Classic.” Diet Originalism bears some relation 
to Originalism Classic in terms of outward appearance, but it contains little 
of the constraint that can weigh down the user.24  
To be clear, so far I mean to describe Balkin’s theory. I do not mean to 
criticize it. For example, I do not fault Balkin for failing to provide a robust 
                                                                                                                      
 18. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (providing that the president must be at least thir-
ty-five years old). 
 19. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 
U.S. 483 (1954). 
 20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 21. See, for example, the five opinions in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 22. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 231. 
 23. For a classic discussion, see generally Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: 
Theory of the Constitution (1982). 
 24. Of course, the phrase “Originalism Classic” risks effacing the many varieties of 
originalism that purport to constrain discretion much more than Balkin’s originalism. For 
discussions of different kinds of originalism, see generally, for example, Mitchell N. Berman, 
Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2009), and Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, 
Living Originalism, 59 Duke L.J. 239 (2009). My purpose, however, is to distinguish 
Balkinian originalism from other originalisms, not to distinguish among the other original-
isms.  
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theory of constitutional decision. I do not believe there is one, at least if one 
wants to account for constitutional practice as it has existed over the course 
of American history and probably must continue to exist if constitutional 
law is to retain its legitimacy.25 Moreover, I share Balkin’s view that the 
constraining capacity of interpretive theories is greatly exaggerated relative 
to other limits on judicial authority.26 
II. Living Constitutionalism 
This Part analyzes Balkin’s systemic theory of constitutional change. It 
mostly, though not entirely, approves of his account. This Part suggests, 
however, that an invested participant who embraces Balkin’s systemic ac-
count may be at a disadvantage in advocating particular interpretations of 
the Constitution. 
A. Historicism, Discretion, and Advocacy 
Constitutional theory requires a persuasive account of legitimate consti-
tutional change, and there is much to admire about Balkin’s. It includes all 
of the relevant actors, movements, and institutions in the American constitu-
tional system. Moreover, it accounts for the pervasiveness of constitutional 
change, both large and small, over the course of American history, regard-
less of whether the public is aware that change is occurring at a particular 
time. In addition, Balkin does not rely on controversial claims that certain 
federal laws or Supreme Court decisions are equivalent to Article V 
amendments. Balkin’s living constitutionalism is thus descriptively more 
accurate than an account that rests only on Article V, and it avoids many of 
the criticisms that have been directed at Bruce Ackerman’s influential theory 
of “constitutional moments.”27  
There is, however, one nontrivial defect with Balkin’s systemic account: 
his framework originalism bleeds into it. As noted above, he approvingly 
describes social movements as engaged in constitutional construction. Con-
struction, however, presupposes respect for the constitutional framework. 
This is because construction, unlike simply starting over again, takes place 
on the framework. The problem for Balkin is that successful social  
                                                                                                                      
 25. I have elsewhere argued that constitutional law must take some account of the con-
ditions of its public legitimation. See generally Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial 
Statesmanship, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 959 (2008). 
 26. See Jack M. Balkin, The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1129, 
1131 (2012) (“Judicial constraint . . . occurs not because judges consciously follow a single 
correct method of interpretation, but because a host of different institutional factors limit who 
can become a judge, structure judicial decision making, and influence the professional and 
constitutional culture in which judges reason and attempt to persuade their audiences.”). For 
further discussion, see pp. 16–20. 
 27. See generally 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991); 2 
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (1998); Bruce Ackerman, The Living 
Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 (2007). For Balkin’s discussion of Ackerman, see pp. 
309–12. 
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movements may have little idea about the original semantic meaning of con-
stitutional language.  
For example, many political advocates for gay rights presumably have 
no knowledge of the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, let 
alone the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause.28 Even so, their activities and those of their adversaries have 
greatly impacted the constructions that enter public discourse and, eventual-
ly, judicial decisions.29 Balkin’s systemic theory of constitutional change 
can account for this phenomenon only if he insulates his living constitution-
alism from his framework originalism. The book, fairly read, does not 
suggest that he realizes this.  
Also worthy of examination is Balkin’s claim that one can adopt both 
living constitutionalism and framework originalism without encountering a 
performative contradiction or engaging in self-undermining behavior.30 Bal-
kin brilliantly invites us to inquire whether the same person can 
simultaneously apprehend the historical processes of constitutional change 
from the systemic point of view while confidently making claims on the 
Constitution in the present from the individual point of view. 
Balkin recognizes that the systemic perspective must be consistent with 
the individual perspective (p. 130). “[P]eople who make arguments internal 
to the practice of constitutional law,” he writes, “should not have to worry 
that arguing that their views are correct is in any way undermined or contra-
dicted by the theory of how the constitutional system produces legitimacy 
over time” (p. 131). He insists that his systemic and individual perspectives 
are consistent.31 Specifically, Balkin writes that embracing constitutional 
historicism implies adopting a twofold apprehension of oneself as a partici-
pant in the constitutional system.32 On the one hand, “[w]e are participants 
in a constitutional system with decided views on what is a good and bad 
interpretation of the Constitution at our moment in time.”33 On the other 
hand, “we are also participants in a constitutional system in which dissent 
and contestation, persuasion and argument, help make the system democrat-
ically legitimate over time.”34 A Balkin-style historicist reasons both 
synchronically and diachronically. While we may think that our own inter-
pretations are right, “we also understand that people’s minds can be changed 
and have been changed, including our own.”35 What is more, we must never 
                                                                                                                      
 28. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text. 
 29. Thus Michael Dorf writes that “genuinely progressive movements of the sort that 
Balkin rightly celebrates do better to use the Constitution, if at all, strategically or even disin-
genuously.” Dorf, supra note 8, at 2054. 
 30. P. 131; Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 183–84. 
 31. P. 131 (“[T]here is no contradiction between these two perspectives.”). 
 32. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 183 (“A historicist view 
of the Constitution implies a dual understanding of ourselves as participants.”). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 183–84. 
 35. Id. at 184. 
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forget that “we have many of the constitutional views we have because of 
the constitutional culture in which we live.”36 
I agree that there is no tension between the systemic and individual per-
spectives if one focuses only on fidelity to the original meaning of a 
constitutional provision, and if the original meaning is determinate. This is 
because of Balkin’s division of labor between living constitutionalism and 
framework originalism. As noted, living constitutionalism is the realm of 
change, and framework originalism is the realm of stability up until ratifica-
tion of an Article V amendment. Insofar as Balkin’s individual perspective 
concerns only the determinate framework, there can be no tension with his 
systemic account of constitutional change. The framework provides clear 
criteria of validity for constitutional views, and the multitude of permissible 
changes in the Constitution in practice over time must respect those crite-
ria.37 
For Balkin, however, the framework decides far fewer questions than do 
typical versions of originalism. When one operates within his spacious 
“construction zone,” there are no clear criteria of constitutional validity. The 
reason why “dissent and contestation, persuasion and argument”38 are possi-
ble is that the legal materials available for use in construction are 
underdeterminate and often severely so. Dissent, contestation, persuasion, 
and argument are unheard of when the text is determinate. Thus, we do not 
debate whether there must be two houses of Congress.39  
Participants in the constitutional system who have adopted Balkin’s sys-
temic perspective necessarily know all of this because underdeterminacy is 
obvious from the systemic perspective. Knowing this, they have no choice 
but to face up to the fact of interpretive discretion. And staring discretion in 
the face may give an interpreter reason to “worry that arguing that their 
views are correct is . . . undermined . . . by the theory of how the constitu-
tional system produces legitimacy over time” (p. 131). Framed precisely, the 
systemic perspective may undermine the individual perspective because un-
derstanding the Constitution from a systemic perspective may require one to 
hold beliefs or attitudes that are in tension with the beliefs or attitudes need-
ed to persuade others about the best meaning of the Constitution. To put it 
bluntly, one may be forced to lie or disguise her actual beliefs about the 
truth of what she is arguing in public in order to participate effectively in the 
system. How does one argue with certainty that one is right and others are 
wrong when one is acutely aware of the discretion and judgment that one is 
exercising? 
One can endeavor to negotiate this problem by being a bit less certain—
that is, by being careful about how one characterizes one’s constitutional 
arguments from the individual perspective. Specifically, one can avoid  
                                                                                                                      
 36. Id.  
 37. Again, I question whether social movements typically behave this way. See supra 
text following note 27. 
 38. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 183. 
 39. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. 
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conflating one’s constitutional constructions with the Constitution itself; one 
can, for example, take care not to frame one’s constructions as timeless and 
logically compelled by the constitutional text. Balkin largely succeeds on 
this score, as he tends to present his nonoriginalist arguments as the best all-
things-considered constructions given who we Americans are as a people at 
this time in our history.40 
Matters are less clear, however, if one focuses on whether characterizing 
one’s constitutional claims in a careful way is self-undermining. Politically, 
it may not be a fair fight if one is as subtle and nuanced as Balkin’s histori-
cist participant while one’s adversaries look people in the eye and tell them 
without hesitation or qualification—tell them unself-consciously—THIS IS 
WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS. It may not matter who is right. 
The concern is not merely that effective advocacy of, or resistance to, 
constitutional change in the present may require one to suppress public ar-
ticulation of one’s systemic account of constitutional change. The concern is 
not about less-than-full candor but about a more troubling trade-off between 
honesty and efficacy.41 Effective advocacy may require the very conflation 
of construction with the Constitution that Balkin’s living constitutionalism 
denies, at least when one’s adversaries conflate the two.42  
In truth, Balkin simply asserts that those who make claims on the Con-
stitution need not “worry that arguing that their views are correct is in any 
way undermined . . . by the theory of how the constitutional system produc-
es legitimacy over time” (p. 131). He never really explains why this is so; 
the matter does not appear to trouble him.  
It would be preferable to be persuaded by Balkin that there is no irrec-
oncilable conflict between the truth of constitutional law’s creation and the 
preconditions of its creation. But there may be cause for concern. Someone 
who has fully embraced both components of Balkin’s theory must argue 
from the individual perspective with the awareness that her views are not 
compelled by the Constitution; that there are other reasonable constructions 
of the Constitution; that the ability of her adversaries to express their views 
is crucial to the system’s legitimacy; that her position is more “best” than 
“true”; that it may not have been best in the past and may not be best in the 
future; and that she possesses the position she is pressing in significant part 
because of the constitutional culture in which she presently lives. She must 
see herself and her constitutional convictions as an effect as well as a cause.  
Just as the ability of one’s adversaries to express their views is crucial to 
the system’s legitimacy, so too is the ability of oneself to express one’s 
views—and to do so without one hand tied behind one’s back. The concern, 
                                                                                                                      
 40. See especially Part II on constitutional construction. 
 41. Paul Mishkin stressed the distinction between dishonesty and less-than-full candor. 
See Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Princi-
ples, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 1473, 
1505 n.168, 1512 (2007). 
 42. To be sure, there are settings in which those who are the most certain that they are 
right do not make the most effective advocates. I am skeptical, however, that American consti-
tutional politics is one of those settings. 
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in other words, is internal to the legitimacy of the constitutional system as a 
whole. If such legitimacy requires the constitutional conversation to include 
all reasonable voices, then participants in ongoing constitutional debates 
should not be at a self-imposed disadvantage stemming from the self-
conscious manner in which they argue from the individual point of view. 
The institutional role that one occupies may make all the difference 
here. It is troubling from the standpoint of scholarly integrity that concern 
over the efficacy of arguments from the individual perspective might move a 
scholar to provide anything but the most accurate account of how our consti-
tutional system functions. By contrast, it may be ethically permissible for 
those whose exclusive business it is to adopt the individual point of view—
specifically, judges and advocates with clients—knowingly to make  
arguments that conflate constitutional meaning with constitutional construc-
tion, and thus to deny the fact of judicial discretion and the existence of 
reasonable disagreement.43 If the ethics of distinct institutional roles require 
different responses to the potential trade-off between honesty and efficacy, 
then scholars, judges, and advocates should respond differently to Balkin’s 
book.  
B. Modernist Anxiety and Postmodernist Detachment 
Much legal scholarship, however, is not entirely sealed off from legal 
advocacy, even when the scholar avoids explicit involvement in litigation 
and politics. The legal scholar, therefore, may have cause for concern that 
adopting Balkin’s systemic account of constitutional change may undermine 
the very individual mechanisms that make such change possible. The legal 
scholar may not feel free to act as if she were certain she was right when, in 
fact, she is not certain.  
And yet Balkin does not share this concern. Maybe this indicates differ-
ences between him and me in subjectivity and temperament.44 Although 
self-diagnosis in a law review is rare, perhaps I suffer from “modernist  
                                                                                                                      
 43. For a rare attempt by a judge to confront the fact of judicial discretion from the 
individual perspective, see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3103 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly an honest reckoning with our discretion allows for honest 
argumentation and meaningful accountability.”). For an illustration of the vulnerabilities to 
which a jurist exposes himself by acknowledging from the individual perspective what is ob-
vious from the systemic perspective, see id. at 3052 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the 
Stevens approach as “incapable of restraining judicial whimsy”). See generally Neil S. Siegel, 
Prudentialism in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 16 (2010). 
 44. Balkin is hardly alone. Robert Post writes that “we are long past the day when we 
can plausibly imagine judicial work as merely ministerial and mechanical, like the work of a 
scribe or a computer,” and “everyone knows that judges have discretion in their interpretation 
of the law.” Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship Between 
Law and Politics, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1319, 1331 (2010). He then observes that “[f]rom the 
internal point of view of the law, of course, judges merely follow the law.” Id. at 1331 n.73. He 
also notes “the knots that judges get themselves into when they seek to reconcile this internal 
perspective with the fact of judicial discretion.” Id. I have difficulty with the “of course” in the 
above quotation in light of Dean Post’s preceding (and correct) observations about the fact of 
judicial discretion.  
Siegel FTP5 B.doc 3/13/2013 9:33 AM 
942 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 111:931 
anxiety,” and perhaps Balkin has moved on to postmodernist detachment 
and irony.45 
In Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, Balkin and his coconspirator, 
Sanford Levinson, investigate the “the increasing sense of isolation and es-
trangement from the past and from tradition” that is partially constitutive of 
modernity.46 Modernists are markers of the passage of time. “An increased 
attention to the historicist elements of culture,” Balkin and Levinson ob-
serve, “brings with it an understanding of the profound differences between 
the perceptions of times past (and irrevocably lost) and those of our own.”47 
What is more, our knowledge of the rifts between past and present produces 
an awareness that the same ruptures will come to characterize the relation-
ship between present and future.48 This “awareness of historical situatedness 
cause[s] us to stand at a suitable distance from our own most deeply held 
convictions.”49  
Modernism is characterized in part by a deep consciousness of one’s 
consciousness—specifically, by concerns about the integrity of one’s con-
sciousness. At the heart of the experience of modernity lie worries about 
genuineness—“questions about the meaning of authenticity, whether of 
one’s beliefs or practices.”50 “Modernity might be described as the experi-
ence of feeling self-conscious about one’s relationship to the past and to 
tradition, isolated and alienated—in a word, inauthentic.”51 Such self-
consciousness can undermine confident, unself-conscious participation in a 
present cultural tradition or social practice. 
When one registers one’s distance from the past (and thus registers the 
present’s distance from the future), one can respond with “modernist anxie-
ty,” a feeling of being unmoored or disconnected, at sea. This experience 
“produces the emotional search for resonance, tranquility, solidity, and sta-
bility.”52 Alternatively, one can find salvation in surrender, accepting in a 
detached way the historical ruptures that have been and will yet be. The 
postmodernist understands that he is inauthentic in an important sense, but 
this does not trouble him. He knows he is playing a role and he is okay with 
                                                                                                                      
 45. See Sanford Levinson & J. M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597, 1627–46 (1991) (book review) (explicating modernist anxiety and con-
trasting it with postmodernist responses to estrangement from the past). 
 46. Id. at 1630. 
 47. Id. at 1631. 
 48. See id. (“[I]n the future our own mixtures of insight and blindness will be interpret-
ed from that then-present perspective from which one tries to understand the past. We will then 
be perceived in ways that we cannot perceive ourselves.” (emphasis added) (quoting David 
Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823, at 15 
(1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 49. Id. at 1632. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1634. 
 52. Id. at 1637. 
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it. “By forsaking modernist anxiety, the interpreter moves closer and closer 
towards postmodern irony.”53  
The modernist is anxious. The postmodernist asks, “[W]hat anxiety?”54 
The modernist is troubled by the irony of the situation in which he finds 
himself: just as he condemns the blindness of previous generations, so too 
will future generations condemn his shortsightedness. The postmodernist 
loses no sleep over this irony. He is at peace with his detachment. 
The difference between modernist anxiety and postmodernist detach-
ment may help to make sense of why I worry about the relationship between 
the systemic and individual perspectives in constitutional law, and why Bal-
kin does not. The rich historicism that characterizes Balkin’s systemic 
perspective captures a defining feature of the experience of modernity: the 
perceived chasm that separates the present from the past. Those who suffer 
from modernist anxiety respond by asking troubling questions about the 
authenticity of their own performances from the individual point of view. 
They worry about how they can be so confident that they are correct when 
they are so mindful of the historically contingent discretion they are exercis-
ing.  
Those who possess postmodernist detachment and irony do not pose 
these potentially paralyzing problems. From their perspective, nothing good 
can come of posing them. Thus Balkin has little or nothing to say about such 
matters in Living Originalism. He just makes the best arguments he can in 
several chapters. And yet there may be cause for concern, even as one con-
tinues to make arguments from the individual point of view.55 All of us are 
“trying to figure out how one meaningfully inhabits a practice of perfor-
mance after innocence has been lost,”56 but we may differ in our responses 
to our shared situation.57 
Modernist anxiety is triggered by being invested as a participant in con-
stitutional practice who also understands how the constitutional system 
operates over time. The tension between the systemic and individual  
                                                                                                                      
 53. Id. at 1639. 
 54. Id. at 1646 n.196. So does the premodernist, but for an entirely different reason. See 
id. at 1646 & n.196. 
 55. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects 
Theory of the Tax Power, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1195 (2012) (arguing that the Taxing Clause justifies 
the Affordable Care Act’s minimum coverage provision and shared responsibility payment); 
Michael C. Dorf & Neil S. Siegel, “Early-Bird Special” Indeed!: Why the Tax Anti-Injunction 
Act Permits the Present Challenges to the Minimum Coverage Provision, 121 Yale L.J. 
Online 389 (2012), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/01/19/dorf&siegel.html (ar-
guing that the federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act allows preenforcement challenges to the 
minimum coverage provision); Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits that the Minimum 
Coverage Provision Respects, 27 Const. Comment. 591 (2011) (arguing that the minimum 
coverage provision is both justified by the Commerce Clause and consistent with judicially 
enforceable limits on the commerce power).  
 56. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 45, at 1658.  
 57. And yet Balkin reaches for originalism. So maybe he has more modernist anxiety 
than he lets on. Cf. id. at 1644 (identifying “Robert Bork’s jurisprudence of original intention 
as a quintessentially modernist response”). 
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perspectives may be compared to the tension between the external and in-
ternal points of view.58 Those who take the external point of view are 
nonparticipants in the system. They are also uninvested in the success of the 
system. Thus the external–internal dichotomy captures characteristic disa-
greements between political scientists and academic constitutional lawyers 
over the grounds of judicial decision. Political scientists typically take the 
external point of view of the uninvested observer.59 Academic constitutional 
lawyers tend to take the internal point of view of the faithful participant who 
may (or may not) have views about how the system moves in history.60 
The external–internal dichotomy also illuminates the disagreement be-
tween H.L.A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin over law’s partial indeterminacy in 
hard cases.61 Hart has an unblinking appreciation of the ineluctability of 
judicial discretion.62 This is because Hart’s legal theory (positivism) is self-
consciously descriptive; he takes the external point of view.63 Standing  
outside of legal practice, he can greet with skepticism the claims of certain 
participants inside (called judges) that they always merely find the law and 
never make the law.64  
Dworkin, by contrast, emphatically rejects the idea that the law ever 
runs out. He equates discretion with lawlessness.65 His position becomes 
more explicable once one apprehends that his jurisprudence is, to a signifi-
                                                                                                                      
 58. For a classic statement of the distinction between the external and internal points of 
view, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 88–91 (2d ed. 1994).  
 59. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of 
Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 587, 605–06 (1963) (“To put it blunt-
ly, the real problem is how the Supreme Court can pursue its policy goals without violating 
those popular and professional expectations of ‘neutrality’ which are an important factor in 
our legal tradition and a principal source of the Supreme Court’s prestige.”); see also Ronald 
Beiner, Political Judgment 159–60 (1983) (distinguishing the reflective and “understand-
ing spectatorship” of the historian from the predictive and “objectifying spectatorship” of the 
social scientist).  
 60. Like Balkin, this Review focuses on invested individuals who can view the constitu-
tional enterprise from either the individual or the systemic perspective. There is no modernist 
anxiety without investment.  
 61. See Hart, supra note 58, at 272 (“The sharpest direct conflict between the legal 
theory of this book and Dworkin’s theory arises from my contention that in any legal system 
there will always be certain legally unregulated cases in which on some point no decision 
either way is dictated by the law and the law is accordingly partly indeterminate or incom-
plete.”). 
 62. See id. (“If in such cases the judge is to reach a decision . . . he must exercise his 
discretion and make law for the case instead of merely applying already pre-existing settled 
law.”). 
 63. See id. at 240 (“My account is descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has no 
justificatory aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms 
and structures which appear in my general account of law . . . .”). 
 64. See id. at 274 (“There is no doubt that the familiar rhetoric of the judicial process 
encourages the idea that there are in a developed legal system no legally unregulated cases. 
But how seriously is this to be taken?”).  
 65. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 37–39 (1986) [hereinafter Dworkin, 
Law’s Empire]; Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 81–130 (1977). 
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cant extent, evaluative and justificatory;66 he takes the internal point of view 
(as well as the individual, invested perspective).67 Indeed, in Law’s Empire 
he denies any distinction between legal philosophy and legal practice.68  
The strength of one is the weakness of the other. Dworkin can make lit-
tle sense of an obvious fact from the external point of view: the 
ineluctability of judicial discretion. Hart never tells us how a judge who is 
aware of the external perspective can perform her internal function honestly. 
Rather, Hart seems to suggest only that the two points of view are reconcil-
able in that the external description of a practice may differ from the way it 
is experienced internally.69 True enough, but this observation does not solve 
the problem of how one is to proceed when in the grip of both perspectives 
simultaneously. While Balkin, unlike Hart, is an invested participant in the 
system he is analyzing, he too never really tells us how a participant who is 
aware of the systemic perspective can perform her individual function hon-
estly and effectively. 
III. Balkin’s Framework Originalism 
This Part analyzes Balkin’s framework originalism. It argues that Bal-
kin’s approach better accounts for the characteristic importance of the 
constitutional text in American constitutional practice than does David 
Strauss’s common law constitutionalism, but that Balkin fails to persuasive-
ly account for the rare but significant instances in which ostensibly clear text 
                                                                                                                      
 66. See, e.g., Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 65, at 90 (describing general theo-
ries of law as “constructive interpretations: they try to show legal practice as a whole in its 
best light, to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best justifica-
tion of that practice,” so that “no firm line divides jurisprudence from adjudication or any 
other aspect of legal practice”).  
 67. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law, in The 
Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical, and Philosophical Perspectives 13, 
25 n.28 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2007). “Understanding 
Dworkin’s claim that there is ‘one right answer’ to any legal question requires understanding 
that for Dworkin the important perspective is that of the judge making the decision.” Id. 
“When we read Dworkin charitably,” Schauer writes, “we see that his ‘one right answer’ claim 
is not an ontological one, but is rather about the processes by which the judge comes to what 
he believes to be the right answer.” Id. “And if we see the ‘one right answer’ claim as one of 
judicial phenomenology and not one of legal ontology, the claim becomes far more plausible.” 
Id.  
 68. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, supra note 65, at 90 (“So any judge’s opinion is 
itself a piece of legal philosophy, even when the philosophy is hidden and the visible argument 
is dominated by citation and lists of facts. Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, 
silent prologue to any decision at law.”); Hart, supra note 58, at 243 (“[Dworkin] identifies 
jurisprudence as ‘the general part of adjudication’, and this is to treat jurisprudence or legal 
theory as itself a part of a system’s law seen from the internal viewpoint of its judicial partici-
pants.”). 
 69. See Hart, supra note 58, at 243 (“[T]he descriptive legal theorist may understand 
and describe the insider’s internal perspective on the law without adopting or sharing it.”); id. 
at 244 (“Description may still be description, even when what is described is an evaluation.”); 
cf. id. at 241 (“It is not obvious why there should be or indeed could be any significant conflict 
between enterprises so different as my own and Dworkin’s conceptions of legal theory.”). 
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does not seem to bind us. This Part then questions the political consequenc-
es—for progressives and for the constitutional system as a whole—of 
embracing any form of originalism, including Balkin’s. 
 
A. Constitutional Convictions 
Why does Balkin, a living constitutionalist if ever there was one, have 
any use for originalism of any stripe? In anticipation of cynics and skeptics, 
he insists that his motives are pure. “I did not become an originalist to hoist 
conservatives by their own petards, or to engage in a shallow ‘me-
toosim[,]’ ” he writes.70 
Balkin’s originalism helps to make sense of some widely shared convic-
tions about the constitutional text—namely, that it is binding law, so that one 
is not free to ignore it when it is clear, such as when it states a fully deter-
minate rule. Almost no one is persuaded by “purposive” (re)readings of the 
various clauses imposing age qualifications for federal offices.71 Almost no 
one argues that Arnold Schwarzenegger may lawfully serve as President.72 
And as much as Sanford Levinson laments various structural features of the 
Constitution, he does not argue that we are free to ignore them—to abolish 
via statute, say, the equal representation of the states in the Senate, the Elec-
toral College, or the president’s veto power. On the contrary, his concerns 
spring from the fact that the text is clear on these matters and he cannot re-
sponsibly advocate ignoring clear text as being consistent with legality.73 
Yet again, Balkin has identified a profoundly important question. Why 
do we regard clear text as binding? The answer is not obvious. Balkin’s 
framework originalism offers a better answer to this question than the one 
provided by a major competitor, David Strauss’s common law constitution-
alism.74  
Strauss recognizes that constitutional interpreters must establish the 
consistency of their interpretations with the text of the Constitution.75 
Strauss accounts for the exalted status of the text by offering a “common 
ground justification.”76 It is sometimes “more important that things be set-
tled than that they be settled right, and the provisions of the written 
Constitution settle things.”77 In Strauss’s view, the text is binding because of 
“the practical judgment that following this text, despite its shortcomings, is 
                                                                                                                      
 70. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 232.  
 71. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (House); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senate); id. art. II, § 1, 
cl. 5 (President). 
 72. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 73. See generally Sanford Levinson, Our Undemocratic Constitution (2006). 
 74. See sources cited supra note 17. 
 75. Strauss, supra note 17, at 103 (describing as “one of the absolute fixed points of 
our legal culture” that “[w]e cannot say that the text of the Constitution doesn’t matter”); see 
id. (“We cannot make an argument for any constitutional principle without purporting to show, 
at some point, that the principle is consistent with the text of the Constitution.”). 
 76. Id. at 101–03. 
 77. Id. at 102.  
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on balance a good thing to do because it resolves issues that have to be re-
solved one way or the other.”78 
Notwithstanding its well-known virtues, Strauss’s account does not per-
suasively distinguish the sanctity of the text from the sanctity of judicial 
precedent. Precedents may serve the same focal-point function that Strauss 
attributes to the text. Revisiting precedents that have long been deemed set-
tled “takes time and energy,” and “can spin out of control and create serious 
social divisions.”79 And yet, American constitutional lawyers regard even 
Marbury v. Madison80 and McCulloch v. Maryland81 as revisitable, at least in 
principle, by the Supreme Court. No portion of truly clear constitutional text 
is so regarded. An amendment is deemed necessary to overcome clear text. 
A common law approach seems unable to make sufficient sense of the spe-
cial importance of the text in constitutional practice. The text is more than a 
common ground or convenience, and certain parts of it are not subject to 
change via common law methods. The text, when it is clear, is characteristi-
cally regarded as binding law.  
Yet Balkin’s approach, too, is not above criticism. He never specifies the 
antecedent theory of obligation according to which clear text binds the pre-
sent. Instead, he variously and vaguely references original acts of popular 
sovereignty (pp. 54–55), rule-of-law values (p. 268), and the need for the 
Constitution to be “our law” (p. 268). He should say more. His account in-
corporates widely shared beliefs about the binding nature of clear text, but 
he does not fully explain why these beliefs are correct notwithstanding vari-
ous objections such as the dead-hand problem.82 
Another problem with Balkin’s approach is that ostensibly clear text 
does not always seem to bind. For example, there are various ways to try to 
negotiate the fact that the First Amendment is directed at Congress alone 
(“Congress shall make no law . . . .”) and not at the federal government more 
generally.83 Balkin argues that this is a clear case of nonliteral usage—that 
“Congress” is a term that “stands for all of the lawmaking and law enforce-
ment operations of the federal government” (pp. 204–05). But 
notwithstanding his formidable arguments, these facts remain: the language 
says “Congress,” not “Congress and the President” or “the United States,” 
and the Constitution elsewhere distinguishes the legislative authority of 
Congress (such as Article I, Section 8) from the enforcement power of the 
Executive (such as the Take Care Clause of Article II, Section 3).  
Similarly, consider Bolling v. Sharpe.84 Chief Justice Warren deemed it 
“unthinkable” that the same Constitution would permit race discrimination 
                                                                                                                      
 78. Id. at 105. 
 79. Id.  
 80. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 81. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 82. See pp. 41–49 (discussing the dead-hand problem).  
 83. U.S. Const. amend. I. 
 84. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).  
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by the federal government while prohibiting it by the states.85 His point 
about “thinkability” likely has more to do with why the case was decided 
the way it was—and why it is regarded as legitimate today—than Balkin’s 
historical argument that “due process already includes ideas of equal protec-
tion” (p. 252). 
Consider another possible example. In Balkin’s view, the original mean-
ing of “Commerce” in Clause 3 of Article I, Section 8 transcends 
commercial or economic subject matter and includes social interactions.86 I 
am persuaded by this broader understanding of “commerce,” but what if it is 
wrong? Other jurists and scholars disagree with Balkin on this point.87 
Even if he is wrong, I still find it hard to believe (notwithstanding my 
modernist anxiety!) that Congress lacks the power to regulate serious  
noneconomic problems of collective action facing the states. As I have ar-
gued elsewhere, the basic structural purpose of Article I, Section 8 is to 
empower Congress to solve collective action problems—including spillover 
effects—that the states cannot address as effectively on their own.88 What 
about a flu pandemic that disrespects state borders, in which case an indi-
vidual might be subject to federal regulation—including a mandate to get 
vaccinated—by simple virtue of the fact that he is present in a particular 
place at a particular time? Robert Cooter and I have unconventionally urged 
looking to the General Welfare Clause in such a scenario,89 but I doubt it 
will fare any better in terms of original semantic meaning.90 
Balkin has a way out of this dilemma if the word “commerce” is ambig-
uous and its meaning is subject to reasonable doubt: under his theory, one 
moves to constitutional construction. In that case, there are sound structural 
reasons—that Balkin and I have separately but similarly articulated91—as to 
why his account is the best construction of an ambiguous text.92  
But Balkin has no way out if there is no ambiguity and he is demonstra-
bly wrong about the original meaning of “commerce.” Even so, the original 
                                                                                                                      
 85. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
 86. See chapter 9; Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2010).  
 87. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce”, 2012 
U. Ill. L. Rev. 623. 
 88. E.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General 
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115 (2010); Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on 
Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 29 (2012). 
 89. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 88, at 170–75. 
 90. The Court would likely tell an “economic” story and rely on the Commerce Clause. 
For a discussion of recent evidence that informs this prediction, see Siegel, supra note 88, at 
52–53.  
 91. See supra notes 86, 88 and accompanying text.  
 92. For Balkin, structural principles are constructions; they are not part of the frame-
work. As Balkin discusses in Chapter Twelve, however, structural principles can be underlying 
principles that are needed to apprehend and apply the text. Those who engage in construction 
ascribe structural principles to the text in order to make sense of it.  
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meaning would not matter—and should not matter—in the case of a public 
health emergency or other circumstances where the stakes are high enough. 
Such examples, although atypical, suggest that we do not always view 
seemingly clear text as binding. We may not view it as binding if (1) we 
perceive something enormously important to be at stake and (2) there are 
ways of making the text seem less clear. If ostensibly clear text is more than 
a convention or convenience, it may also be less than fully binding under 
certain circumstances.  
B. Political Consequences 
So far I have inquired into whether framework originalism makes sense 
of widely shared constitutional convictions. Another conversation worth 
having is whether a collective commitment to originalism can underwrite 
the legitimacy of the constitutional system as a whole. Because legitimation 
of the constitutional system, like the legitimation of any governmental insti-
tution, “is constituted by its collective acceptance,”93 answering this 
question turns on the potential consequences of talking Balkin’s talk in the 
world—how it may move people who are not constitutional scholars and 
who do not teach in law schools.  
One possibility is that progressive constitutionalists, like their conserva-
tive counterparts, will be able to leverage the power of text and history to 
express their own constitutional convictions. Thus Balkin writes that 
“originalism, textualism, and a return to basic principles resonate so deeply 
with the public,” and that “people routinely invoke the founders and their 
great deeds in arguing with each other about what the Constitution truly 
means.”94 Balkin is right to counsel progressives not to reflexively run from 
text and history: constitutional fidelity requires attention to both; they are 
often persuasive forms of constitutional authority; and they do not compel 
conservative outcomes as a general matter. More ambitiously, Balkin may 
pull off a feat of intellectual judo by capturing and repurposing originalism. 
But there is another possibility. Ours is a world in which originalism has 
been identified with conservatism in American law and politics for dec-
ades.95 In such a world, progressive constitutionalists should ask themselves 
what conservative activists, politicians, and judges might do with a progres-
sive declaration that “we are all originalists now.”  
For example, will such a declaration lend support to viewing the Court’s 
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller96 as a good-faith attempt at apply-
ing a methodology that (if Balkin succeeds) may appear universally shared? 
                                                                                                                      
 93. John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 117 (1997); see id. at 
118 (“[I]nstitutions survive on acceptance . . . .”). 
 94. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 2, at 233. 
 95. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America (1990); Antonin Scalia, 
A Matter of Interpretation (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion 
of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989). 
 96. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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The Heller Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment is consistent 
with Balkin’s thin framework, and the Court’s interpretation is one of  
several possible constructions of the text.97 Whoever one thinks was the bet-
ter originalist in Heller, Justice Scalia must have been pleased that Justice 
Stevens elected to fight on Justice Scalia’s “turf.”98 What about an originalist 
rejection of post-1937 Commerce Clause jurisprudence, as Justice Thomas 
urges?99 What about an originalist rejection of abortion rights, which may be 
advanced if defenders of such rights concede that the debate should be  
decided on originalist grounds?100 Conservative-originalist defenses of  
progressive achievements such as constitutional sex equality are likely to 
remain exceptional and marginally significant in any event, coming as they 
do decades after the key fights were had.101  
Some of Balkin’s critics do not appear to register this concern. Judging 
from casual conversation in the faculty lounge and conference halls, they 
tend to focus instead on whether Balkin himself is politically motivated in 
embracing originalism. More important than the purity of Balkin’s heart, 
however, is the question of political consequences even if Balkin himself 
has the best of intellectual intentions.  
Nor does Balkin appear to register this concern. He is an astute observer 
of the politics of conservative originalism,102 but he does not consider the 
pertinence of these politics to the political reception of his own framework 
originalism. Overlooking the potential effects of embracing any sort of 
“originalism,” he may misdiagnose the principal causes of progressive re-
sistance to his approach.  
Balkin opines that living constitutionalists may resist framework 
originalism because (1) “they are not sure what framework originalism actu-
ally entails”; (2) “they instinctively fear that originalism of any form leads 
to reactionary policies and blocks beneficial change”; and (3) “as members 
of a learned elite they tend to associate the Constitution not with its text but 
with the rules, doctrines, and commentaries that professional lawyers know 
                                                                                                                      
 97. Balkin himself has written that Heller was rightly decided. See Jack M. Balkin, 
Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 Const. Comment. 427, 436 (2007) (“I 
believe that the same history that shows that the Fourteenth Amendment established an anti-
subordination principle also shows that the Second Amendment protected an individual right 
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 98. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 637 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 99. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (The Health Care Cases), 132 S. Ct. 
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 100. See pp. 214–18; Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Com-
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and whose knowledge distinguishes them from nonprofessionals.”103 Here I 
think Balkin errs.  
If progressive scholars are unsure of what framework originalism en-
tails, then the distinction between interpretation and construction will likely 
be lost on activists, politicians, and judges who are accustomed to conflating 
originalism with conservatism, and to using originalism in the narrow fash-
ion that Balkin rejects. In political discourse, for example, one routinely 
hears arguments from original intent or original expected application (“the 
Framers/Founders never would have protected abortion or gay rights”); one 
rarely encounters a Balkinian argument about the original semantic meaning 
of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses (that supports abortion 
rights and gay rights).104 Progressives may thus have good reason to fear 
where any originalist approach will lead in America in 2013. Their concerns 
may have little to do with preservation of elite forms of professional reason. 
The foregoing concerns about framework originalism are especially rel-
evant to progressive constitutionalists, but they are not merely relevant only 
to them. If one believes, as Balkin wisely does, that the legitimacy of the 
constitutional system depends on a diversity of constitutional convictions, 
then one should care whether accepting Balkin’s framework originalism 
would toss everyone into an originalist camp that is easily caricatured as 
embracing conservative constitutional commitments. This would be unprob-
lematic from a systemic perspective if almost everyone in the United States 
was (the same kind of) conservative, but the country is heterogeneous. A 
similar problem would be posed if a prominent conservative legal academic 
were to call upon fellow conservatives to declare boldly that “we are all liv-
ing constitutionalists now” during a period of liberal ascendancy in law and 
politics.105 In a well-functioning system—a system that gives voice to the 
extant diversity of constitutional opinion—one side of a longstanding clash 
of constitutional visions does not make fundamental moves that help its ad-
versaries much more than they help itself.  
The concern I am raising is empirical. Will Balkin’s work capture 
originalism, or will it be captured by the conservative political practice of 
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originalism?106 I fear the latter is more probable. In fact, I predict that Bal-
kin’s originalism will be hijacked and mischaracterized by others who have 
a more conservative agenda than Balkin. When it happens, Balkin’s defend-
ers will at least have work like this to cite in response. I do not doubt that 
there are times when it is stunningly effective to seize a word or an idea and 
redeploy it for different purposes.107 But in this instance, Balkin’s ideologi-
cal adversaries may be more likely to execute the backflip than he is.  
To be clear, I am not suggesting that scholars should remain silent about 
some truth out of concern that others will misuse it. Here, a label other than 
“framework originalism” would equally (or better) approximate the truth. As 
noted in Part I, Balkin’s originalism is so much thinner than conventional 
forms of originalism that it is difficult to overstate the contrast. It turns out 
that we are not all originalists now, not even Balkin. The umbrella label of 
“originalism” misleads more than it leads. It would be more illuminating to 
distinguish Balkin’s Diet Originalism from Originalism Classic, and to de-
scribe the individual component of his theory as “framework textualism.”  
I do not expect Balkin to give up the “O” word. This ship of his has al-
ready left the harbor, and his mind has long been on a quest to overcome 
apparent oppositions.108 But those who think they may like the taste of Diet 
Originalism might consider my suggestion to choose a healthier alternative. 
Conclusion 
If a common theme links the concerns I have raised about Living 
Originalism, it is the difference between constitutional theory in an ideal 
world and constitutional theory in the fallen world we inhabit. In an ideal 
world, all participants in constitutional debates would resist conflating their 
constitutional constructions with the Constitution itself. But in a world in 
which one’s adversaries strenuously reject any such distinction, a historicist 
appreciation of constitutional reality as it really is may cause one to bring 
the nuanced tools of a scholar to a blunter form of social interaction.  
In an ideal world, there would be no cause for modernist anxiety and 
thus no occasion for self-consciousness about one’s constitutional convic-
tions. But in a world in which innocence has been lost, some of us may 
doubt that we can move as effortlessly as Balkin does from the systemic to 
the individual points of view, and then back again. 
In an ideal world, one could evaluate the extent to which Balkin’s 
framework originalism makes sense of our constitutional convictions with-
out considering the real-world implications of declaring that “we are all 
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originalists now” in public debates. But in our fallen world—a world whose 
fallenness Balkin writes about so movingly in Living Originalism and Con-
stitutional Redemption—it would be naive and potentially damaging to 
proceed in such a fashion.  
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